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“Running the Government Like a Business”: 
Wisconsin and the Assault on Workplace 
Democracy
introduction: democratic spring
The news is filled with reports of democratic movements challenging 
authoritarian rule in the Middle East and elsewhere, prompting a nigh 
unanimous outpouring of support from across the American political 
spectrum. But a conflict much closer to home—the crisis in Wisconsin and a 
growing number of states over collective bargaining rights for public-sector 
workers—has produced a more mixed and complex reaction. To be sure, 
most polls suggest that a majority of Americans opposes efforts by 
Republican-dominated state governments to strip public-sector employees 
of their bargaining rights.1 But a sizeable minority supports those efforts,2
1. See, e.g., Doug Mataconis, Have Republicans Lost the Public Relations War over 
Public Sector Unions?, OUTSIDE THE BELTWAY (Mar. 3, 2011), http://
www.outsidethebeltway.com/have-republicans-lost-the-public-relations-war-over-public
-sector-unions (analyzing three public opinion surveys—a CBS/New York Times poll, a 
NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll, and a Rasmussen poll—and concluding that 
“Americans remain strongly supportive of unionism in general and the idea of the right 
to collective bargain with one’s employer, even when that employer happens to be the 
government”); Ohio Women Lead in Disapproval of New Governor, QUINNIPIAC UNIV.
POLLING INST. (Mar. 23, 2011), http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x1322.xml?ReleaseID=1570 
(reporting that in the bellwether state of Ohio, “[v]oters oppose legislation . . . that 
would limit the ability of public workers to collectively bargain”).
2. See, e.g., Lydia Saad, More Americans Back Unions Than Governors in 
State Disputes, GALLUP (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/146921/
Americans-Back-Unions-Governors-State-Disputes.aspx (reporting that 39% of 
Americans “say [they] agree more” with the governors and 48% “say [they] agree more” 
with the unions in ongoing disputes over collective bargaining and state budgets).
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and challenges to the role of teachers unions—the public sector’s most 
visible organized cohort—have been issuing from the right and left alike.3
And while a consensus may be emerging among the credible commentariat 
that Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker “overplayed his hand”—using a 
budget crisis as a pretext for punishing unions he views as political 
opponents4—the frequent portrayal of teachers and other civil servants as 
members of a privileged and overpaid class who enjoy jobs for life and the 
benefits of “lavish” health care and pension plans has clearly found some 
traction with the viewing public, despite the considerable gap between that 
image and the daily lives of most of those thus portrayed.5
But I want to argue here that the stakes in Wisconsin have less to do 
with the bona fides of budget crises and benefits packages than with 
something a great deal more fundamental: the struggle between democratic 
governance and authoritarian control in the American workplace. I don’t 
wish to overstate the parallel to events in the Middle East, where the 
courage of the men and women who have joined the unprecedented wave of 
antigovernment protests is nearly beyond measure. But unions give 
American workers something that markets and employers seldom afford 
them and that contemporary American law does not otherwise provide: a 
genuine voice in important decisions about their work lives and the power 
to make that voice heard. The attack on public-sector unions thus threatens 
to exacerbate what is already a breathtaking “democracy deficit” in U.S. 
labor relations and—should the effort gain traction and succeed—to cut 
American workers altogether out of a role in workplace governance. Indeed, 
now that private-sector union representation in the United States has 
reached a post-World War II low of under 8%,6 the mantra of Republican 
3. See, e.g., Andrew Rice, Miss Grundy Was Fired Today, N.Y. MAG., Mar. 20, 2011, 
http://nymag.com/news/features/michelle-rhee-2011-3 (analyzing recent critiques of 
public school teachers “from union-busting Republicans on the right and wealthy 
liberals on the left”).
4. See, e.g., David Brooks, Op-Ed., Make Everybody Hurt, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/22/opinion/22brooks.html; Evan McMorris-Santoro, 
The Next Union Battlefield in Ohio: The Ballot Box, TALKING POINTS MEMO 
D.C. (Mar. 4, 2011, 8:36 AM), http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com/2011/03/
the-next-union-battlefield-in-ohio-the-ballot-box.php.
5. See, e.g., The Daily Show with Jon Stewart: Crisis in Dairyland
—Apocalypse Cow (Comedy Central television broadcast Mar. 10, 
2011), available at http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/thu-march-10-2011/crisis-in
-dairyland---apocalypse-cow (collecting clips from Fox News and other sources 
criticizing the “lavish, with a capital L, benefits” enjoyed by public school teachers who 
assertedly work “a part-time job, [where] they’re done at 2:30”).
6. Compare News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Union 
Members—2010, at 7 tbl.3 (Jan. 21, 2011) [hereinafter BLS News Release], available at
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state officials that government should be “run like a business”7 may well 
portend a clean and decidedly non-union sweep for the public-sector
workforce as well.
Yet in my experience there aren’t many folks in the legal academy—or 
the legal profession more generally—who understand public-sector labor 
relations well enough to know just what to make out of the current crisis; 
indeed, there aren’t that many labor law professors who have much 
familiarity with the subject, though Lord knows of late we’ve been 
scurrying to get up to speed. So in order to lay out my argument that 
what’s at stake here is the survival of workplace democracy—and not, as 
even many progressives tend to assume, just another stage in the decline of 
a relic better suited to mines and factories than to the contemporary 
economy—I am going to need to provide a quick overview of some 
important points about public-sector union representation.
This Essay will therefore proceed as follows. In Part I, I explain why 
public-sector labor relations law is for most of us terra incognita, attributing 
the information gap to the absence of focus on public-sector issues in U.S. 
labor law teaching and scholarship. In Part II, I identify an important 
consequence of that gap: the failure of most contemporary accounts of the 
steep decline in private-sector union density to reckon with an equally 
dramatic increase in public-sector union density, contrasting fortunes that 
offer strong support for the view that labor law itself has played a robust 
role in whether and when American workers are able to secure an organized 
voice in the workplace. In Part III, I bring the differences between private-
and public-sector labor law into focus and compare the union density 
figures with polling and survey data on the attitudes of American 
workers—union and non-union alike—to support my claim of a “democracy 
deficit” in workplace governance. In Part IV, I examine the details of the 
recent anti-union initiatives in Wisconsin and elsewhere and the likely 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf (reporting that 2010 private-sector
union representation is 7.7%), with Steven Greenhouse, Union Membership in U.S. Fell 
to a 70-Year Low Last Year, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/
01/22/business/22union.html (putting post-World War II unionization at 35%).
7. See, e.g., John O’Connor, Senate Panel OKs Giving Governor More Power, THE STATE
(Columbia, S.C.), Mar. 25, 2011, http://www.thestate.com/2011/03/25/1750365/
senate-panel-oks-giving-governor.html (quoting a spokesman for South Carolina 
Governor Nikki Haley as suggesting that she is seeking “to run[] state government 
like a business”); Press Release, Scott Walker for Wisconsin Governor, 
Walker Outlines Blueprint To Bring 250,000 Jobs to Wisconsin 
(Sept. 16, 2010), available at http://www.scottwalker.org/press-release/2010/09/
walker-outlines-blueprint-bring-250000-jobs-wisconsin (describing constituents as 
“customers” and suggesting that parts of the state government ought “to operate more 
like a business”).
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consequences for the democracy deficit if the initiatives in question stand 
and spread. Part V concludes with an examination of the argument—often 
(and wrongly) attributed to President Franklin D. Roosevelt—that public-
sector unions promote workplace democracy at the expense of civic 
democracy and popular sovereignty; I argue that precisely the opposite is 
the case and that union representation for public-sector workers is a critical 
feature of contemporary participatory democracy.
i . the well-kept secret of public -sector labor law:
its causes and cure
Simply put, public-sector labor law is a well-kept secret because U.S. 
labor law scholars—not exactly a growth industry to begin with—devote 
relatively little scholarly energy to it and seldom have occasion to teach it 
to students. It gets very little attention in the most popular labor law
casebooks, and few law schools offer it with any frequency as a freestanding 
course. To be sure, there are some important exceptions on both the 
scholarly and the teaching fronts—Joe Slater, Marty Malin, and Ann 
Hodges have been doing particularly thoughtful work in the field8—but for 
most of us it is a bit of a black hole.
On the one hand, this is somewhat surprising. One might think that the 
presence of an important sector of the U.S. economy that has been bucking 
the de-unionization trend—especially a sector that has historically been an 
important source of economic advancement for women and people of color 
marginalized in the private sector—would be of great interest to the left-
liberals and progressives who predominate in our common field. On the 
other hand, our focus in recent years on the steep private-sector decline is 
perhaps understandable.9 Given that crisis, turning one’s attention to the 
public sector might have seemed a bit like the fellow who loses his keys in 
the night but leaves the spot where he dropped them to search instead 
under a nearby streetlight, reasoning that it is so much brighter there.
8. See, e.g., MARTIN H. MALIN, JOSEPH E. SLATER & ANN C. HODGES, PUBLIC SECTOR 
EMPLOYMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 2011); JOSEPH E. SLATER, PUBLIC 
WORKERS: GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE UNIONS, THE LAW, AND THE STATE, 1900-62 (2004); 
Ann C. Hodges, Lessons from the Laboratory: The Polar Opposites on the Public Sector 
Labor Law Spectrum, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 735 (2009); Martin H. Malin, The 
Paradox of Public Sector Labor Law, 84 IND. L.J. 1369 (2009).
9. See, e.g., CYNTHIA ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: FROM SELF-REGULATION 
TO CO-REGULATION (2010); Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 
29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685 (2008).
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A second reason for the gap is that public-sector labor law is not an easy 
“thing” to study. Since the private sector in the United States is for the 
most part governed by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)10 and 
administered by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) with 
appellate review by the federal courts,11 labor scholars who wish to study 
the field know just where to look, at least when it comes to the law on the 
books. By contrast, public-sector employees—federal, state, and local—are 
expressly excluded from NLRA coverage.12 Federal employees have their 
own labor relations statute (the Federal Labor Relations Act),13 and state 
and local employees—who make up the vast majority of U.S. public-sector
workers14—are governed by labor relations laws that vary from state to 
state.
That variance can be substantial. At one end of the spectrum, a handful 
of states prohibit public-sector collective bargaining altogether;15 at the 
other, a somewhat larger group (but still a small minority) of states not only 
authorize public-sector collective bargaining but take the further, 
controversial step of permitting public employees to strike.16 Moreover, as 
the recent developments in Wisconsin and elsewhere remind us, labor law at 
the state level is very much a moving target, in stark contrast to the 
NLRA, which has proven virtually impossible to amend for the past half 
century.17 Given the multiplicity of sources and the diversity and 
malleability of content, it is far more difficult for scholars and teachers to 
paint the public sector with a broad brush. Indeed, there is no Model Public 
Employees Relations Act or Restatement of Public Sector Labor Law to 
work with—though one is tempted to add that the latter may be a good 
thing lest public-sector workers suddenly find themselves to be employed 
“at will.”18 At the same time, focusing like a laser beam on local law is not a 
10. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2006)).
11. See NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 153 (describing the structure and the functions of the NLRB); id. 
§ 160(e)-(f) (outlining appellate review).
12. See id. § 152(2)-(3).
13. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7106, 7111-7123, 7131-7135 (2006).
14. BLS News Release, supra note 6, at 8 tbl.3 (reporting a combined total of 17.5 million
state and local employees versus 3.6 million federal employees).
15. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-98 (2009).
16. See, e.g., 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 315/17 (2011); 115 id. § 5/13(b).
17. See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
1527 (2002).
18. See Matthew W. Finkin et al., Working Group on Chapter 2 of the Proposed Restatement of 
Employment Law: Employment Contracts: Termination, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 93,
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great strategy for securing tenure or enhancing the curriculum of a law 
school with national aspirations.
The longstanding habit of viewing private-sector labor relations in 
relative isolation has had less than salutary consequences for our 
understanding of one of the most important developments in our field. But 
whatever the reasons for this past neglect, “we are all badgers now”19 and 
labor law scholars are certainly paying more attention in the wake of what 
is happening in Wisconsin and other states.
ii . a tale of two demographics
Consider the recently released figures from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics revealing that in 2010 union representation in the private sector
fell to 7.7%—a remarkable decline from a post-World War II peak in excess 
of a third of the working population20—while representation among public-
sector workers, virtually non-existent until the late 1950s, hit 40%.21
Indeed, the number of public-sector union workers in the United States now 
exceeds the number in the private sector, a striking development given that 
public-sector employees comprise less than 17% of the American 
workforce.22
What are we to make of these figures? As suggested earlier, the 
attention of those in the labor field has been focused almost entirely on the 
private-sector decline, and a variety of plausible causes have been 
canvassed in the literature: the disappearance of mining and manufacturing 
jobs—once the bedrock of union membership in the United States—and the 
rise of a less union-friendly service economy;23 a decline in “career”
99 (2009) (critiquing job security provisions of the proposed restatement of private-
sector employment law for embracing a far more robust version of the employment-at-
will rule than is justified by the case law).
19. Stanley Fish, We’re All Badgers Now, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (Mar. 21, 2011, 
8:30 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/21/were-all-badgers-now 
(applauding the effort of the faculty at University of Illinois at Chicago to unionize in 
solidarity with Wisconsin educators and other workers).
20. See Greenhouse, supra note 6.
21. BLS News Release, supra note 6, at 7-8 tbl.3.
22. Id. (reporting 8.4 million public-sector union workers versus 7.9 million private-sector 
union workers and 21.1 million public-sector workers versus 103 million private-sector 
workers).
23. See, e.g., Henry S. Farber & Bruce Western, Accounting for the Decline of Unions in the 
Private Sector, 1973-1998, in THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE SECTOR UNIONISM IN THE UNITED 
STATES 28, 29 (James T. Bennett & Bruce E. Kaufman eds., 2002) (arguing that “most
of the decline in the [private-sector] union membership rate is due to differential 
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employment and a marked increase in outsourcing, subcontracting, and 
project work;24 the ill fit between traditional union-negotiated workplace 
rules and the asserted need for “flexibility” in an increasingly competitive 
global economy;25 the perception that labor unions—once viewed as a 
critical countervailing force to heartless employers imposing starvation 
wages and onerous working conditions on a vulnerable working class—have 
little role to play in the contemporary workplace, where employees enjoy 
legal protection against such predations through minimum wage laws, the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act, and a host of other state and federal 
statutes;26 and finally the flourishing of an “information” economy with so-
called “knowledge” workers who neither need nor want unions since 
workplace hierarchies have flattened and the conflict between capital and 
labor—the motive force in traditional U.S. labor relations—has been 
greatly diminished.27
There is no doubt some truth to each of these now-familiar talking 
points, but there are important though less familiar counterfactuals. The 
supposedly union-resistant service economy, for example, is proving to be 
surprisingly fertile ground for organizing, as contemporary unions enjoy 
impressive successes in a variety of service industries including 
hospitality,28 security services,29 custodial and landscaping work,30 and 
home health care.31 Moreover, many of these successes have occurred in the 
employment growth rates in the union and nonunion sectors,” specifically in service-
producing rather than goods-producing sectors and professional and managerial 
occupations rather than blue-collar occupations).
24. See, e.g., KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT 
REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 51-66 (2004).
25. See, e.g., id.
26. See, e.g., James T. Bennett & Jason E. Taylor, Labor Unions: Victims of Their Own 
Political Success?, in THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE SECTOR UNIONISM IN THE UNITED 
STATES, supra note 23, at 245, 247 (making the case that this “substitution hypothesis” 
helps explain union membership decline).
27. See, e.g., ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF 
A HIGH-VELOCITY LABOR MARKET (2003).
28. See, e.g., HOTEL WORKERS RISING, http://www.hotelworkersrising.org (last visited June
21, 2011).
29. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Office Security Guards Reach Union Accord, N.Y. TIMES:
CITY ROOM BLOG (June 25, 2008, 5:15 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/
2008/06/25/office-security-guards-reach-union-accord.
30. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Janitors’ Drive in Texas Gives Hope to Unions, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 28, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/28/national/28janitor.html.
31. See, e.g., Stu Schneider, Victories for Home Health Care Workers: Home Care Workers Get 
Organized, DOLLARS & SENSE, Sept.-Oct. 2003, at 25-27, available at 
http://www.directcareclearinghouse.org/download/homehealthcare.pdf.
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context of outsourced and subcontracted work—the Justice for Janitors 
campaign in Los Angeles and other cities is a prime example32—and 
“project” work has posed no bar to longtime union representation for 
musicians, actors, and construction employees working out of union hiring 
halls.33 As for the assumed ill fit between unions and “knowledge” workers, 
it’s worth noting that over 40% of teachers and others in the education, 
training, and library occupations currently enjoy union representation, 
constituting what is by some distance the most unionized occupational 
cohort in the entire U.S. economy.34 Meanwhile, numerous studies reveal 
widespread and flagrant violations of minimum wage and workplace safety 
regulations among firms employing low-wage workers,35 and the relentless 
incantation of the “flexibility” mantra—a.k.a. the effort to shift the risks of 
the business cycle to workers and their families by eliminating job 
security—is evidence of a deep and abiding conflict between the voracious 
demands of capital and the all-too-human needs of labor.
In sum, there are reasons to doubt the seemingly widespread assumption 
that the principal reason for the decline in union density is that American
workers don’t want or need unions because they have little role to play in 
the contemporary economy. Indeed, there is another account, one that has 
its provenance in work done in the 1980s by Paul Weiler, who argued that 
the principal reason for the decline in private-sector union density is that 
U.S. employers are increasingly breaking the law to thwart union 
organizing efforts and that American labor law does little to deter or to 
remedy the unlawful efforts.36 Other scholars have occasionally taken up 
this theme—Cindy Estlund expanded on it to particularly powerful effect a 
32. Justice for Janitors, SERV. EMPS. INT’L UNION (SEIU), http://www.seiu.org/division/
property-services/justice-for-janitors (last visited June 21, 2011).
33. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation, CAREER GUIDE TO 
INDUSTRIES, 2010-11 EDITION, http://www.bls.gov/oco/cg/cgs031.htm (last modified 
Dec. 17, 2009) (noting that unions play an important role in the performing arts sector); 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Motion Picture and Video Industries, CAREER GUIDE TO 
INDUSTRIES, 2010-11 EDITION, http://www.bls.gov/oco/cg/cgs038.htm (last modified 
Dec. 17, 2009) (“Virtually all film production companies and television networks sign 
contracts with union locals that require the employment of workers according to union 
contracts.”); BLS News Release, supra note 6, at 7 tbl.3 (showing that the union 
representation rate in the construction industry is 14%, a full six percentage points 
above the private-sector average).
34. See BLS News Release, supra note 6, at 7-8 tbl.3.
35. See, e.g., ESTLUND, supra note 9, at 64-67 (examining violations of health and safety 
laws); Brishen Rogers, Toward Third-Party Liability for Wage Theft, 31 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2010) (examining violations of minimum wage laws).
36. Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization Under the 
NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769 (1983).
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few years back37—and a rich body of empirical work has likewise developed 
to support the lawless employer/toothless law thesis.38 But in most of this 
work the public sector has been ignored or given the shortest of shrift,39 and 
the contention here is that if we view the American workforce as a whole—
taking the private and public sectors together—the case for the Weiler 
thesis is considerably strengthened.
iii . what’s law got to do with it?
There are two critical differences between the rules that govern labor 
relations in the private sector and those in the public setting, and they go a 
long way toward explaining the contrasting fortunes of private- and public-
sector unions. Simply put, private-sector workers risk their jobs when they 
try to organize a union and—if they are successful in their organizing 
efforts—they must risk their jobs a second time to secure gains through 
collective bargaining. In the public sector, by contrast, employees almost 
invariably engage in both union organizing and collective bargaining 
without exposing themselves to such risks.
A. The Risk of Discharge for Union Organizers and Supporters
On the organizing front, private-sector workers are far more vulnerable 
to retaliatory discharge at the hands of an anti-union employer than their 
public-sector counterparts. While the law on the books protects both 
private-sector and public-sector employees against retaliation for union 
37. See Estlund, supra note 17.
38. See Benjamin I. Sachs, Enabling Employee Choice: A Structural Approach to the Rules of 
Union Organizing, 123 HARV. L. REV. 655, 684-85 (2010) (collecting and analyzing 
studies).
39. The rare exception is the work of (naturally) a public-sector labor law specialist, on 
which I will frequently draw in Part III of the Essay. See Joseph E. Slater, The 
“American Rule” that Swallows the Exceptions, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 53 (2007) 
[hereinafter Slater, American Rule]; Joseph E. Slater, Lessons from the Public Sector: 
Suggestions and a Caution, 95 MARQ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) [hereinafter Slater, 
Lessons]; see also Tom Juravich & Kate Bronfenbrenner, Preparing for the Worst: 
Organizing and Staying Organized in the Public Sector, in ORGANIZING TO WIN: NEW 
RESEARCH ON UNION STRATEGIES 262 (Kate Bronfenbrenner et al. eds., 1998) 
(comparing employer anti-union conduct in private- versus public-sector union 
campaigns).
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support,40 the overwhelming majority of private-sector employees work 
under the employment-at-will rule, meaning in essence that their employer 
can fire them at any time for any reason not prohibited by law. As I have 
argued elsewhere, as a result, a discharged organizer faces an uphill battle in 
establishing that the employer’s motive in firing her was to thwart the 
campaign.41 An employer so accused will ordinarily assert reasons for the 
dismissal that have nothing to do with the union—reasons such as 
insubordination or malingering, though under the “any” reason standard of 
employment-at-will the possibilities here are by definition virtually 
limitless.42 To be sure, in good years the NLRB is quite adept at seeing 
through pretexts, but the resulting process—from the filing of a charge of 
anti-union dismissal through complaint and hearing to judicial review—
takes an average of two or three years.43 Even if everything goes right, at 
the end of it all, a successful employee is entitled to no more than 
reinstatement (a frightening prospect in itself for most discharged workers) 
and back pay less interim earnings.44 An employer therefore may decide 
that this is a small price to pay for thwarting a union organizing effort.
According to an impressive body of empirical studies, a shocking 
percentage of U.S. employers comes to precisely that calculation. One 
recent study estimated that as many as one in five U.S. workers who 
supports a union campaign as an “activist” is unlawfully fired for her 
efforts,45 and another puts the odds at one unlawful discharge for every 
40. In the private sector, see 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2006) (prohibiting discharge and other 
discrimination on the basis of union support); in the public sector, see, for example, 5 
U.S.C. § 7116(a)(2) (importing the same rule for federal employees).
41. See Richard Michael Fischl, “A Domain into Which the King’s Writ Does Not Seek To 
Run”: Workplace Justice in the Shadow of Employment-at-Will, in LABOUR LAW IN AN 
ERA OF GLOBALIZATION: TRANSFORMATIVE PRACTICES AND POSSIBILITIES 253 (Joanne 
Conaghan, Richard Michael Fischl & Karl Klare eds., 2002) (analyzing the challenge of 
establishing unlawful motive against the backdrop of employment-at-will).
42. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-Will World, 74 
TEX. L. REV. 1655, 1670-78 (1996).
43. See Sachs, supra note 9, at 2695 & n.34.
44. On the “dismal” success rate of reinstatement in NLRB discharge cases and the limited 
monetary remedies available, see Fischl, supra note 41, at 255-57.
45. JOHN SCHMITT & BEN ZIPPERER, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, DROPPING THE 
AX: ILLEGAL FIRINGS DURING UNION ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 11 (2007), available at 
http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/unions_2007_01.pdf (“If we assume that 
ten percent of pro-union workers are union activists, and that employers target union 
activists, then we estimate [based on NLRB records of illegal firings during organizing 
campaigns] that in 2005 union activists faced about an 18 percent chance of being fired 
during a union-election campaign.”).
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three union campaigns.46 And while there is disagreement over the precise 
frequency,47 there is no disputing that retaliatory discharges are an all-too-
common feature of private-sector union campaigns—generating between 
six- and seven-thousand discriminatory dismissal charges filed with the 
NLRB in a typical year48—and it is well recognized that such discharges are 
highly likely to halt a union campaign in its tracks.49
The contrast to the public sector could scarcely be greater.50 Most 
public-sector workers, at both the state and federal levels, enjoy the 
protections of civil service law and accordingly cannot be discharged 
without “just cause” or its equivalent.51 If a union organizer is fired in the 
midst of a campaign, the burden is on the employer to establish that this 
was not a retaliatory dismissal and that there was a good reason (not just 
“any” reason) apart from the organizing campaign to fire the employee.52
Moreover, because their employer is the government, public-sector
46. See Kate Bronfenbrenner, No Holds Barred: The Intensification of Employer Opposition to 
Organizing 10 (Econ. Policy Inst., Briefing Paper No. 235, May 20, 2009), available at
http://epi.3cdn.net/edc3b3dc172dd1094f_0ym6ii96d.pdf.
47. For a perceptive discussion of the various studies and their significance, see Sachs, supra
note 38, at 684-85.
48. See NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., SEVENTY SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2007, at 122
tbl.2 (2007), available at http://nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/documents/119/nlrb2007.pdf; 
NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., SEVENTY THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2008, at 80 
tbl.2 (2008), available at http://nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/documents/119/nlrb2008.pdf; 
NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., SEVENTY FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2009, at 94
tbl.2 (2009), available at http://nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/documents/119/nlrb2009.pdf.
49. See Bronfenbrenner, supra note 46, at 10.
50. For a comprehensive analysis of the legal protections against anti-union discharge 
available in the public-sector setting, see Slater, American Rule, supra note 39, at 88-90.
51. See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 75 (McKinney 2011) (stating that a covered public 
employee “shall not be removed or otherwise subjected to any disciplinary penalty 
provided in this section except for incompetency or misconduct shown after a hearing 
upon stated charges pursuant to this section”); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 741.807 (West 
2011) (stating that “[n]o regular employee in the classified service shall be removed 
except for just cause”); WIS. STAT. § 230.34(1)(a) (2009) (“An employee with permanent 
status in class or an employee who has served with the state as an assistant district 
attorney for a continuous period of 12 months or more may be removed, suspended 
without pay, discharged, reduced in base pay or demoted only for just cause.”). See 
generally Slater, American Rule, supra note 39, at 88 (“While not all public officials are 
covered by just cause rules (policy-making officials typically are not, and there is often a 
probationary period for lower-level workers), the vast majority of public employees 
eligible to form unions are covered by such rules.”).
52. See id. at 89-90.
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employees protected by civil service laws may enjoy due process rights in
discharge cases that are not available against private-sector employers, and 
accordingly such employees will rarely face the sort of summary dismissal 
permissible in the private sector under employment-at-will.53 As a result of 
these protections, retaliatory discharges for union organizing are 
comparatively rare in the public sector.54 To be sure, this is in no small part 
the product of a culture in which public employers generally proceed with 
caution in dismissal cases, but the underlying legal protection has no doubt 
played a large role in the development of that culture.
B. Job Security Risks During Collective Bargaining
When employees in the private sector are successful in organizing a 
union, they face further risks to their jobs when the union and their 
employer commence collective bargaining over wages, hours, and working 
conditions. A private-sector union’s principal source of bargaining power is 
the strike—the collective withholding of labor by the employees—or a 
credible threat that a strike will be mounted. This is a difficult undertaking 
in the best of circumstances, since striking employees and their families will 
have to make do without their paychecks or (in the vast majority of states) 
unemployment benefits for the duration of the strike, and the limited strike 
benefits available from most unions are nowhere near enough to make ends 
meet. But of far greater concern to most employees is the very real prospect 
that the strike will cost them their jobs.
This threat is a result of yet another gap between the law on the books 
and the law in action, for the NLRA explicitly protects the right to strike 
and proscribes employer interference with that right.55 But the courts have 
interpreted the provisions in question to permit employers to hire 
“permanent replacements” for striking workers—replacements whom the 
employer is free to retain come the end of the strike.56 The strikers, by 
contrast, have no right to re-employment unless and until there are post-
strike vacancies in the employer’s workforce.57 Particularly during periods 
of economic stagnation or decline, the prospect of striking and thus risking 
53. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
54. See Juravich & Bronfenbrenner, supra note 39, at 257 tbl.16.2 (estimating the frequency 
of discharge in a public-sector organizing campaign at 5% versus 30% for the private 
sector).
55. See NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1), 163 (2006).
56. The seminal case is NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
57. See, e.g., NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus. Servs., Inc., 700 F.2d 385, 389 (7th Cir. 
1983).
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a job you have now for benefits that your union may or may not be able to 
achieve at the bargaining table—and which you may or may not be around 
to enjoy—is daunting, to say the least.
To be sure, employers have enjoyed the right to hire permanent 
replacements in the face of a strike since the earliest days of the NLRA,58
but studies confirm a dramatic increase in the frequency of recourse to that 
right since the late 1970s,59 coincident with the steep decline in private-
sector density over the past three decades. The resultant effect on 
bargaining success rates has been devastating: a recent study reveals that 
nearly two-thirds of U.S. private-sector unions are unable to secure a 
contract within a year of recognition and that nearly half are unable to 
achieve one at all.60
The contrast to the public sector is once again stark. In most states, 
public-sector unions do not (and indeed cannot) strike in support of 
bargaining demands; instead, a union’s source of power at the bargaining 
table is a system of “interest arbitration.”61 Although the details vary from 
state to state, the basic format works like this: if the employer and union 
fail to reach an agreement on a collective contract, a neutral arbitrator 
conducts proceedings in which the parties present evidence and arguments 
for their respective bargaining positions and then renders a decision, 
typically guided by such factors as comparable pay rates for similarly 
situated workers and the budgetary constraints on the government 
employer.62 In this setting, it is data and evidence, persuasive arguments, 
and reasonable proposals—rather than a self-immolating strike—that 
secures a union’s goals in collective bargaining.
And even in the minority of states that do authorize public-sector
strikes, for a variety of reasons—including civil service protections, state 
labor relations board rulings, and the previously described culture of job 
security in the public sector—public-sector workers seldom, if ever, face the 
prospect of permanent replacement in the course of a strike, eliminating for 
58. See Mackay Radio, 304 U.S. 333.
59. See, e.g., Michael H. Leroy, Regulating Employer Use of Permanent Striker Replacements: 
Empirical Analysis of NLRA and RLA Strikes 1935-1991, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 169, 189-91 (1995).
60. See JOHN-PAUL FERGUSON & THOMAS A. KOCHAN, SEQUENTIAL FAILURES IN WORKERS’
RIGHT TO ORGANIZE 1 (2008), available at http://www.americanrightsatwork.org/
dmdocuments/sequential_failures_in_workers_right_to_organize_3_25_2008.pdf.
61. Slater, Lessons, supra note 39.
62. See id.
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them as well the threat to job security faced by their private-sector
counterparts.63
C. The Private/Public Difference and the Democracy Deficit
In sum, for the past several decades we have in effect been running a 
natural experiment to determine the difference between union density rates 
for employees who must risk their jobs to secure organizing rights and 
bargaining gains and those who can succeed on both fronts at relatively 
little risk to the prospect of continued employment. There should be no 
surprise that the figure for the former is less than one-fifth of the magnitude 
of the latter.
That this difference represents a “democracy deficit”—meaning that the 
private-sector figures do not reflect a decreased desire among employees for 
union representation but are instead the result of unlawful employer efforts 
to thwart that desire—is further buttressed by empirical work exploring the 
attitude of American workers toward unionization. In the well-known and 
frequently cited study What Workers Want—the product of a 
comprehensive multi-year survey conducted among private-sector workers 
in the United States—Richard Freeman and Joel Rogers reported that 32% 
of workers who were not represented by unions wished they were and that 
90% of those who were wanted to stay that way.64 Taking the figures 
together—at a time when union density was running just over 10%—the 
authors concluded that the statistics “implied a desired rate of private-
sector unionization of 44%.”65 Surely it is no coincidence that, in the one 
sector of the American economy where workers don’t face the threat of job 
loss for their union efforts, union density rates closely approximate that 
“desired” rate of unionization, and that employees who do face such a
threat are organizing at a much lower rate.
It is of course possible that there are other differences between the 
private-sector and public-sector workforces that might account for the 
dramatically different degrees of unionization, but it is difficult to imagine 
just what those might be. The notion, for example, that public-sector
workers are more “liberal” politically—and therefore more inclined to join 
unions—is undermined a bit by the fact that two of the most heavily 
63. See Slater, American Rule, supra note 39, at 86 (finding no case of a legally authorized 
permanent replacement in the public sector).
64. RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 17, 96-98 (2d ed. 2006).
65. Id. at 17; see also id. at 17-18 (analyzing Harris, Hart, and Zogby polling conducted
between the initial 1999 study and 2006 and concluding that the desired rate of 
unionization had, if anything, increased in the interim).
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unionized occupations in the public sector are police and firefighters,66 not 
exactly strongholds for liberal sentiments. The notion that demographics 
play a major role is likewise difficult to sustain; for example, overall women 
are somewhat less likely than men to be represented by a union,67 but they 
predominate in the field of education, the most unionized occupational 
cohort of all.68 Indeed the sheer variety of blue collar, pink collar, and white 
collar occupations in the public sector—together with the fact that two of 
the largest occupational cohorts (education and health care) traverse the 
public/private boundary—suggest that there’s nothing inherent in the 
characteristics of the workforces in question which would predict strongly 
different views on unionization. There is, to be sure, one major difference 
with a lot of explanatory power: private-sector employers are nearly five 
times more likely than their public-sector counterparts to mount an 
aggressive effort against a union campaign and six times more likely to 
break the law while doing so.69 But that’s precisely the difference that the 
Weiler thesis would predict.70
There is thus ample reason to infer that the public-sector union density 
figure is a far superior measure of the appetite of American workers for 
union representation than the private-sector figure, but—given my 
argument here—it’s fair to ask whether a desire for union representation is 
the same as a desire for workplace democracy. As it happens, the argument 
for that correlation is even stronger in the case of public-sector workers 
than it is for their private-sector counterparts. Here’s why.
One of the principal benefits of union representation for private-sector
workers is job security, for unionized workers almost invariably enjoy the 
benefits of collectively bargained “just cause” protection,71 in contrast to 
non-unionized private-sector workers who are overwhelmingly “at will.”
Private-sector union workers also stand to gain substantially from the so-
called “union wage premium,” which is estimated to push private-sector 
66. See BLS News Release, supra note 6, at 7 tbl.3 (reporting union density of 37% among 
protective service occupations).
67. See id. at 5 tbl.1 (12% versus 14% in 2010).
68. Compare id. at 7-8 tbl.3 (showing a union density rate of 41% in education, training, and 
library occupations), with U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY 14 tbl.11 (2010), available at www.bls.gov/
cps/cpsaat11.pdf (reporting that 74% of employees in those occupations are women).
69. See Juravich & Bronfenbrenner, supra note 39, at 266-67 tbl.16.2.
70. See Weiler, supra note 36.
71. See LAURA J. COOPER ET AL., ADR IN THE WORKPLACE: A COURSEBOOK 249, 258 (2000) 
(reporting that 92% of private-sector collective-bargaining agreements contain a “just 
cause” provision).
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wage and benefits 15-20% higher than the wage and benefit package of non-
union but otherwise similarly situated workers.72 Indeed, the increase in
labor costs is a principal reason that many employers give for opposing 
unions.73 The support for union representation in the private sector may 
accordingly have less to do with a generalized desire for workplace 
democracy than for what collective worker voice buys them—i.e., job 
security and a better pay package; indeed, the Freeman and Rogers survey 
confirms that union workers are far more likely to cite improved pay and 
working conditions as the principal benefit of union representation than 
having a say in workplace governance.74
By contrast, as noted earlier most public-sector workers already enjoy 
“just cause” protection under civil service laws, and their ability to bargain 
over benefits is often narrowly circumscribed; in most states, for example, 
public-sector pensions are established via legislation rather than collective 
bargaining, and in the federal sector employees can’t bargain over wages or 
benefits at all.75 So what’s the payoff in union representation for such 
workers?
A report in the New York Times about the recent union representation 
vote among the airport screeners working for the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) is revealing in this respect, contrasting the prospect 
of participation in workplace governance through union representation with 
the unilateral authority of the non-union employer.76 Why, the article asks, 
would the screeners want to unionize, since their union (like most federal 
employee unions) won’t be able to bargain over wages, health benefits, or 
pensions and will also operate with additional restrictions (such as the 
preclusion of bargaining over job qualifications and discipline standards) in 
the name of “national security”? The answers offered by interviewed union 
supporters speak volumes. One employee, a nine-year veteran of the 
72. See, e.g., David G. Blanchflower & Alex Bryson, What Effect Do Unions Have on Wages 
Now and Would Freeman and Medoff Be Surprised?, in WHAT DO UNIONS DO? A
TWENTY-YEAR PERSPECTIVE 79, 86, 88 tbl.4.3 (James T. Bennett & Bruce E. Kaufman 
eds., 2007).
73. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Case Against the Employee Free Choice Act 24-25 
(Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 452, 2009), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1337185.
74. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 64, at 107 (noting that 48% of union workers identified 
“[b]etter pay/working conditions” as “the most important thing a union does for its 
members” versus 11% who chose “[m]ore say in workplace issues”).
75. See Joseph E. Slater, Public Sector Labor in the Age of Obama, 86 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 
2011).
76. Steven Greenhouse, Unions Woo Airport Security Screeners, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/16/business/16screeners.html.
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agency, explained that “screeners ‘don’t have any voice on the job.’”
Another said, “We’re the black sheep of the federal government. There are 
no work floor regulations for us so when there’s an issue, management’s 
attitude is: ‘It’s our way or the highway.’” And a third—an army veteran 
who had opposed unionization when he was hired but had come to a 
different view on the job—reported that “management staff treats us like 
we’re children.”77
In a memorable presentation at a labor law conference some years back, 
Kris Rondeau—one of the leading figures in the successful union campaign 
among Harvard’s clerical workers during the 1970s and 1980s—sounded 
those themes and made the case for union representation in the most 
succinct and eloquent form I have ever encountered:
[We told our colleagues] that self-respecting adults represent 
themselves in all things. And to the extent any American worker can 
look around wherever he or she is, they see successful people 
representing themselves. They see that there’s no such thing as 
someone who they consider successful in their lives not requiring 
that they will be in the room where decisions are made about their 
lives.78
As suggested earlier, it may be the case that employees who already enjoy 
the benefits of union representation take “be[ing] in the room” for granted, 
but Freeman and Rogers confirm that unrepresented workers experience a 
deep and abiding “influence gap” between their desire for having a say in
workplace governance and the willingness of employers to satisfy that 
desire.79
In other countries, there are alternative legal mechanisms available to 
empower worker voice, from works councils to health and safety 
committees, but efforts to explore such initiatives during the Clinton 
77. Id. Of the nearly 20,000 TSA employees who voted in the ensuing election, well over 
80% supported union representation. Because the union support was divided nearly 
equally between two labor organizations—the American Federation of Government 
Employees and the National Treasury Employees Union—a runoff election will be 
conducted to determine the organization that will serve as the screeners’ bargaining 
representative. Steven Greenhouse, Airport Screeners Need Runoff to Pick a Union, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 20, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/21/business/21screener.html.
78. Kris Rondeau, Remarks at the Critical Legal Studies Conference: Can the 30s and the 
60s Equal the 90s? (Jan. 1989) (recording on file with author). On the Harvard 
campaign more generally, see JOHN HOERR, WE CAN’T EAT PRESTIGE: THE WOMEN 
WHO ORGANIZED HARVARD (1997).
79. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 64, at 76-77.
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Administration foundered in the face of steadfast opposition (and not a 
little red-baiting) from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and other employer 
representatives.80 As a result, under U.S. law a union is the only form of 
representation that is, as a practical matter, open to American workers, and 
the public sector is the one place where that form of representation has been 
flourishing—the one place where workers, who clearly desire a voice in 
workplace governance, enjoy a right to secure such a voice that is available 
in practice and not just on paper. The recent efforts in Wisconsin and other 
states to deprive workers of that right thus ought to be viewed as a serious 
threat to what is all too rapidly becoming the last bastion of democratic 
governance in the American workplace.
iv. madison-ian democracy 2.0
So what exactly is going on in Wisconsin and other states where public-
sector unions appear to be in for a serious challenge? To keep an already too 
long Essay from getting much longer, I’ll focus here exclusively on 
Wisconsin, though the provisions of the bill in question are similar in broad 
effect to the law enacted in Ohio at the end of March and to the executive 
orders issued a few years back by Indiana Governor Mitch Daniels reversing 
a decade and a half of collective bargaining practice in that state.81
A. Parsing the New Law
As of this writing, Wisconsin’s legislation—signed by Governor Scott 
Walker in March after a now-infamous journey through the state 
legislature—has been given the green light by the state supreme court, but 
a coalition of unions has filed a lawsuit in federal court challenging many of 
its provisions; in the meantime, recall elections have been scheduled for 
July for six Republican senators who supported the Governor’s bill and 
80. For background on the Chamber of Commerce campaign, see generally John Logan, The 
Clinton Administration and Labor Law: Was Comprehensive Reform Ever a Realistic 
Possibility?, 28 J. LABOR RES. 609, 619-20, 622-23 (2007).
81. S.B. 5, 129th Gen. Assemb. § 4117.08 (Ohio 2011) (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (West 2011)), available at http://
www.legislature.state.oh.us/BillText129/129_SB_5_EN_N.pdf; Ind. Exec. Order 05-14 
(Jan. 11, 2005) (repealing Ind. Exec. Orders 90-6 (May 22, 1990), 97-8 (Oct. 1, 1997),
and 03-35 (Oct. 1, 2003), which were issued by Governors Evan Bayh, Frank O’Bannon, 
and Joseph Kernan respectively). For a perceptive account of the similarities as well as 
some important differences between the Wisconsin and Ohio approaches, see Steven 
Greenhouse, Ohio’s Anti-Union Law Is Tougher than Wisconsin’s, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/01/us/01ohio.html.
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three Democrats who opposed it, and the possibility of a differently 
constituted state senate may not bode well for the law’s future, irrespective 
of what eventually happens in the courts.82 So the final chapter of this story 
is far from written.
Broadly speaking, the law seeks to accomplish four discrete ends: (1) 
eliminating collective bargaining altogether for some categories of workers; 
(2) eliminating or limiting collective bargaining for most of the rest of the 
public sector workforce with respect to particular bargaining subjects; (3) 
requiring an annual vote by employees to re-authorize bargaining by each 
state union; and (4) prohibiting the right of unions to secure the payment of 
representation fees via paycheck deduction. I will briefly address each in 
turn.
(1) The law eliminates collective bargaining altogether for home health 
care workers, family child care workers, employees of University of 
Wisconsin hospitals and clinics, and faculty and staff at the University of 
Wisconsin.83
(2) For the remaining public-sector workers, collective bargaining is 
eliminated altogether for working conditions and non-wage benefits (such as 
health care coverage and pensions).84 Although bargaining over wages is
still permitted, wage increases will be approved (if at all) on an annual basis 
and capped at the rise in the Consumer Price Index.85
(3) Employees in every union will be required to vote annually on 
whether to continue such representation,86 a change from the former 
practice—and the practice followed in virtually every other private- and
public-sector setting in the United States—of certifying continuing 
82. See Wisconsin v. Fitzgerald, No. 2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W (Wis. June 14, 
2011), available at http://www.wicourts.gov/sc/opinion/DisplayDocument.html?
content=html&seqNo=66078. On the federal suit brought by the unions, see Don 
Walker & Patrick Marley, Unions Seek To Overturn Court Order Reinstating Collective-
bargaining Law, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 15, 2011, http://www.jsonline.com/
news/statepolitics/123921154.html. On the recall efforts—which are also under legal 
challenge—see Tom Tolan, Patrick Marley & Jason Stein, Recall Elections Set for 3 
Democratic Senators, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 15, 2011, http://www.jsonline.com/
news/statepolitics/123516934.html. Because of the legal challenge that eventuated in the 
state supreme court decision, the law has not yet been published; accordingly, citations 
here are to the bill as passed by the state legislature and signed by the governor. A.B. 
11, 2011 Leg., Spec. Sess. (Wis. 2011) [hereinafter Wisc. Bill].
83. Wisc. Bill §§ 10, 12, 30, 45, 79, 80, 82, 84, 90-93, 164,-65, 186, 188, 196-97, 209, 229, 265, 
269, 279, 302, 304, 307, 317, 323, 335, 370, 374.
84. Id. §§ 95, 210, 214, 245, 262, 314.
85. Id. § 169.
86. Id. § 289.
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representation on the basis of a single initial vote and holding subsequent 
votes only if employees seeking ouster come forward with evidence that a 
substantial percentage desires decertification. Moreover, to secure 
recertification, each union will need to win the votes of a majority of the 
workers employed in the particular bargaining unit (e.g., the teachers in a 
particular school district or the civil servants in a particular office) rather 
than merely securing a majority from among the ballots actually cast,87 the 
conventional method of measuring majority rule in union representation 
elections.
(4) Finally, the new law imposes steep obstacles on the ability of public-
sector unions to secure the payment of fees designed to cover the costs of 
union representation in grievance proceedings, in collective bargaining, and 
in other endeavors. In the private sector, this is typically accomplished by 
the inclusion of two provisions in a collective-bargaining agreement: an 
“agency shop” provision (which requires employees to pay reasonable 
representation fees to the union as a condition of continued employment) 
and a “dues checkoff” provision (which requires that the fees in question be 
deducted from paychecks). In the public sector, these provisions are 
frequently referred to together as a “fair share” agreement, the idea being 
that each individual represented by the union must pay his or her “fair 
share” of the union’s representation costs. Under the Wisconsin law, “fair 
share” agreements are prohibited altogether; that is, individual employees 
may no longer be required to make “fair share” payments as a condition of 
employment, and government employers may no longer deduct such fees 
from their paychecks.88
The likely effects of these provisions will be fairly self-evident to labor 
lawyers and scholars, but for other readers a word or two describing the 
devastating impacts may be in order. The provisions eliminating bargaining 
rights altogether for home health care and family child care workers target 
two of the most economically vulnerable occupational cohorts in the state, 
and the sudden and dramatic de-unionization of faculty and others at the 
University of Wisconsin will have a profound effect on governance and 
morale at that institution. I’ll have something more to say about the long-
87. Id. Oddly, the provision also requires that a union secure 51% of the votes rather than 
the conventional majority measure of 50% plus one. See id. This would mean, for 
example, that a union that won the votes of 101 employees in a 200-worker unit would 
not be certified as bargaining representative despite enjoying the support of a clear and 
unambiguous majority of eligible voters. It’s not clear from the sources I’ve been able to 
access whether this represents a deliberate effort to make recertification even more 
difficult for Wisconsin unions or simply a misunderstanding of the arithmetic ordinarily 
involved in calculating a “majority.”
88. Id. §§ 200, 213, 219, 223, 227, 276.
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term benefits issue in a moment,89 but I suppose that taking that off the 
table will free up unions to face the considerable institutional and logistical 
burdens that will necessarily attend a “permanent campaign”90 in the face 
of those annual re-certification elections, an extraordinary waste of time 
and resources for all concerned—including, in an era of budget crises, the 
state agency that is required to conduct all those elections.91 Indeed, it’s 
worth noting that an application of the majority-of-eligible-voters test for 
determining the election winner—instead of the more conventional measure 
of a majority of those voting—would invalidate the results of most U.S. 
political elections conducted in recent decades, strongly suggesting that 
something other than a desire to promote democratic decisionmaking is at 
work here. And finally, the elimination of “fair share” agreements means 
that public-sector unions will predictably face the “free rider” problems 
already faced by private-sector unions in right-to-work states: an inability 
to collect representation fees from employees who enjoy the benefits of 
collective bargaining and whom the union is nevertheless bound by law to 
represent.
As many news stories and columns about these new laws have noted, the 
fact that it’s Wisconsin whose laws are at stake is particularly devastating 
as a symbolic matter. Wisconsin has a storied past when it comes to labor 
matters, having been the first state to enact workers compensation, 
unemployment benefits, and—ironically enough—collective bargaining for 
public-sector workers, which it did in 1959.92 Indeed, given the state’s 
strong and longstanding union tradition, those in the labor movement may 
quite reasonably be concerned that if it could happen there, it could happen 
with considerable ease in the many states with less union-friendly cultures.
B. Making Sense of These Initiatives
Those leading the charge for these restrictions are clearly taking a page 
from the playbook of Rahm Emanuel, for they are certainly not letting the 
89. See infra notes 102-106 and accompanying text.
90. Cf. SIDNEY BLUMENTHAL, THE PERMANENT CAMPAIGN: INSIDE THE WORLD OF ELITE 
POLITICAL OPERATIVES (1980).
91. See, e.g., Kevin Lee, Wisconsin Union Elections Pose Logistical Difficulties, STATEHOUSE 
NEWS ONLINE.COM (Mar. 31, 2011), http://statehousenewsonline.com/2011/03/31/
wisconsin-union-elections-pose-logistical-difficulties (reporting the concerns of the 
General Counsel of the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission).
92. William Cronon, Op-Ed., Wisconsin’s Radical Break, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/22/opinion/22cronon.html.
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financial crises faced by many states go to waste.93 In many cases, the crises 
do indeed require swift and decisive action, and public-sector payrolls are 
frequently a substantial part of a state budget and thus a highly plausible 
target, especially when health care and pension costs are included in the 
mix. And in laying the blame for budget woes at the feet of public-sector
workers—while painting an image of them as overpaid and underworked—
officials have found a receptive audience among many taxpayers who see 
themselves as “footing the bill” despite their own financial crises born of job 
losses, health care costs, mortgage troubles, and greatly diminished pensions 
and savings.
But for a host of reasons, the bona fides of the underlying argument are 
open to serious questions, and opinion polls in the wake of the Wisconsin 
crisis suggest that much of the public is asking those questions.94 It is one 
thing to contend that public-sector workers must “share in the sacrifices”
required by budget crises; it is another thing altogether to call for the repeal 
of a half century of collective bargaining rights.
Indeed, early in the dispute, the unions in Wisconsin signaled their 
willingness to meet all of the governor’s financial demands by agreeing to 
make sizeable contributions to their health care and pension plans—
contributions which together amounted to a de facto pay cut in the 
neighborhood of 10%,95 no small thing for working families living paycheck 
to paycheck. The refusal of the Republicans to settle for those concessions 
and declare victory suggests that the real target was unions rather than 
budget cuts. And a provision of the Wisconsin bill that I haven’t mentioned 
until now all but confirms that suspicion. The bill excludes police and 
firefighters unions from all of the anti-union provisions discussed earlier—
the limitations on bargaining subjects, the annual re-election requirement, 
the prohibition of “fair share” agreements—and the members of those two 
unions just happened to have supported Governor Scott Walker’s campaign 
for office.96
Given the circumstances, there can be little doubt that these initiatives 
are payback time, driven at least in part by a desire to defund the 
93. See, e.g., Jeff Zeleny, Obama Weighs Quick Undoing of Bush Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/10/us/politics/10obama.html (quoting Emanuel’s 
famous dictum, “Rule one: Never allow a crisis to go to waste”).
94. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 1-2.
95. See Steven Greenhouse, Union Leader Minces No Words when Labor Issues Are at Stake, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/23/us/23beil.html.
96. See Todd Richmond, Wisconsin Contract Bill Political Payback?, 
BLOOMBERG, Feb. 14, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-14/
wisconsin-contract-bill-political-payback-.html.
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Democratic Party, traditionally the beneficiary of sizeable campaign 
contributions by organized labor. In an era when so much private-sector
organizing is among low-wage workers whose union dues cannot do much 
more than cover the costs of bargaining and representation, targeting 
unions of higher-income public-sector workers is a potentially effective 
strategy for depleting labor’s coffers—and, not coincidentally, for silencing 
the most powerful and effective voice working people have in American 
politics.
But the troubling dimensions of the anti-union effort do not stop there. 
The likely consequences of the Wisconsin effort for female workers in 
particular are striking and difficult to ascribe to mere oversight. Women 
make up the vast majority of home health care and family child-care 
workers,97 the two occupations singled out for losing their collective-
bargaining rights altogether. Moreover, if the pay and benefits cuts lead to 
a reduction in these services, the consequences will predictably fall more 
heavily on those who have traditionally provided the lion’s share of care 
work in their own homes: (you guessed it) women.98 Women also comprise a 
large majority of the public school teachers, librarians, and staff who form 
the largest single cohort of workers hurt by the other provisions of the 
Wisconsin bill,99 and they are traditionally under-represented among police 
and firefighters, the two occupations exempted altogether from the 
proposed restrictions.100 In view of these consequences, the refrain that 
public-sector workers are “the new welfare queens”101—conjuring up the 
Reagan-era image of folks living beyond their station at the expense of 
hardworking taxpayers—is revealing as much for its misogynistic 
undertones as it is for the ugly racial stereotypes it invokes.
97. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 68, at 16-17 tbl.11 (reporting that nearly 
95% of child-care workers and 90% of health care support workers are women).
98. See NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR CAREGIVING WITH AARP, CAREGIVING IN 
THE U.S. 2009, at 14, available at http://www.caregiving.org/data/
Caregiving_in_the_US_2009_full_report.pdf (reporting that two-thirds of all family 
caregivers are women).
99. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 68, at 15 tbl.11 (reporting that nearly 
74% of education, training, and library workers are women).
100. See id. at 16 tbl.11 (reporting that only 21% of the protective services occupation 
workforce nationwide were women in 2010, including 4% of fire officers and 13% of
police officers).
101. Cf. Jonathan Cohn, Why Public Employees Are the New Welfare Queens, 
THE NEW REPUBLIC: CITIZEN COHN (Aug. 8, 2010, 11:56 PM), http://www.tnr.com/blog/
jonathan-cohn/76884/why-your-fireman-has-better-pension-you (citing refrain but 
arguing that the larger problem is “that retirement benefits for everybody else have 
become too stingy”).
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Moreover, in the larger debate that the Wisconsin crisis has provoked, 
some important facts about public-sector unions are getting lost in the 
crossfire. For one thing, a wealth of empirical studies demonstrates that—
for comparably educated individuals—public-sector workers are paid less 
and sometimes significantly less than their counterparts in the private 
sector. And those figures include the supposedly “lavish” health care and 
pension benefits packages.102 Indeed, the principal effect of unionization on 
pay and benefits in the public sector is egalitarian: it tends to raise the 
compensation of less educated workers in lower-pay occupations at the 
expense of the more highly educated professionals in the public employ, and 
the relatively lower earnings of the latter thus account for the lion’s share of 
the public-private differential.103 Research confirms that Wisconsin follows 
precisely this pattern. Thus, public-sector workers in that state enjoy a pay 
and benefits package that is on average 5% lower than that of private-
sector workers with comparable education and skills. But college-educated 
and especially professional employees account for most of that differential, 
and workers without a high school education are compensated somewhat 
more generously than their private-sector counterparts.104 It is these 
vulnerable workers who thus stand to lose the most if the Wisconsin bill 
becomes law.
I do not mean for a moment to minimize the serious difficulties 
presented by the high cost of public-sector pension benefits in a number of 
jurisdictions. To some extent, they are the result of a “perfect storm” of 
factors. On the one side, there are unions doing what American unions in 
the public and private sectors have always done: negotiating for a pay-and-
benefit package that emphasizes long-term benefits over pay rates. On the 
other, there are public officials who sought to appease union demands with 
the promise of deferred benefits that some later administration would have 
to worry about, and that day has finally come.
But this perfect storm can only account for so much of the current 
difficulty, because in most states pensions are established by law—in many 
cases, laws that predate collective bargaining and that typically cover 
102. See David Lewin et al., Getting It Right: Empirical Evidence and Policy 
Implications from Research on Public-Sector Unionism and Collective Bargaining 4-6 
(Emp't Policy Research Network, White Paper, Mar. 16, 2011), 
available at http://www.employmentpolicy.org/topic/402/research/getting-it-right 
(collecting numerous studies).
103. See id. at 6.
104. See Jeff Keefe, Wisconsin Public vs. Private Employee Costs: Why Compare Apples to 
Oranges?, ECON. POLICY INST. (Policy Memorandum No. 173, Feb. 2011), available at
www.epi.org/page/-/old/policy/EPI_PolicyMemorandum_173.pdf.
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public officials, managers, and non-union employees as well as union 
members.105 There are some obvious abuses (such as pension “spiking,” i.e., 
basing benefits on an annual income figure inflated by overtime and other 
pay strategically accrued during the final year or years of employment) that 
can and should be eradicated. And there are other practices—such as early 
retirement at full benefits and so-called “double-dipping” (permitting 
retirees with generous benefit packages to secure employment in another 
capacity for the state)—that might be justified in some circumstances (e.g., 
early retirement for firefighters, who have worked thirty years at a 
dangerous and physically demanding job) but should be restricted in others 
(e.g., law professors).106
Eliminating public-sector collective bargaining won’t advance such 
salutary efforts; in the many states where pension rules are established by 
positive law—and where the principal beneficiaries of some of the dodgier 
practices are managers and other high-end employees who aren’t even union 
members—it won’t address the abuses at all. Indeed, as the unfolding 
drama in Wisconsin reminds us, remedial efforts are far more likely to 
achieve viable and broadly acceptable results if the workers’ representatives 
are made part of the process rather than banished to the sidelines.
v . conclusion: and now a word from our founder
Whatever else might be said about the current crisis, it has gratified my 
sense of irony to see proponents of the restrictive legislation citing as 
authority none other than Franklin D. Roosevelt, whose presidency ushered 
in the New Deal and with it the Wagner Act that laid the groundwork for 
the organizing rights enjoyed by private-sector workers. In passages that 
have gone viral on the Internet107—lifted from a letter the President wrote 
to the leader of a labor organization representing federal employees—
Roosevelt argued forcefully that “the process of collective bargaining, as 
usually understood, cannot be transplanted into the public service”; that 
“[t]he very nature and purposes of Government make it impossible for 
administrative officials to represent fully or to bind the employer in mutual 
105. See Lewin et al., supra note 102, at 8.
106. See id. at 11-12.
107. See, e.g., Patrick McIlheran, FDR’s Ghost Is Smiling on Wisconsin’s Governor, REAL 
CLEAR POLS. (Feb. 19, 2011), http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2011/02/19/
the_ghost_of_fdr_is_smiling_on_wisconsins_governor_108962.html; James Sherk, 
F.D.R. Warned Us, N.Y. TIMES: ROOM FOR DEBATE (Feb. 19, 2011, 9:38 PM), http://
www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/02/18/the-first-blow-against-public-employees/
fdr-warned-us-about-public-sector-unions.
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discussions with Government employee organizations”; and in particular 
that strikes and other “militant tactics” by public-sector workers were 
“unthinkable and intolerable.”108
But the full text of the letter suggests a more nuanced position than the 
one implied by the quoted passages, and I lay it out here so that readers can 
judge for themselves, though I have italicized two passages, which are 
typically omitted and which I will emphasize in a moment:
My dear Mr. Steward:
As I am unable to accept your kind invitation to be present on the 
occasion of the Twentieth Jubilee Convention of the National 
Federation of Federal Employees, I am taking this method of 
sending greetings and a message.
Reading your letter of July 14, 1937, I was especially interested in 
the timeliness of your remark that the manner in which the 
activities of your organization have been carried on during the past 
two decades “has been in complete consonance with the best 
traditions of public employee relationships.” Organizations of 
Government employees have a logical place in Government affairs.
The desire of Government employees for fair and adequate pay, 
reasonable hours of work, safe and suitable working conditions, 
development of opportunities for advancement, facilities for fair and 
impartial consideration and review of grievances, and other objectives of 
a proper employee relations policy, is basically no different from that of 
employees in private industry. Organization on their part to present their 
views on such matters is both natural and logical, but meticulous 
attention should be paid to the special relationships and obligations of 
public servants to the public itself and to the Government.
All Government employees should realize that the process of 
collective bargaining, as usually understood, cannot be transplanted 
into the public service. It has its distinct and insurmountable 
limitations when applied to public personnel management. The very 
nature and purposes of Government make it impossible for 
administrative officials to represent fully or to bind the employer in 
mutual discussions with Government employee organizations. The 
108. Letter from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to Luther C. Steward, 
President, Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps. (Aug. 16, 1937), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=15445.
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employer is the whole people, who speak by means of laws enacted 
by their representatives in Congress. Accordingly, administrative 
officials and employees alike are governed and guided, and in many 
instances restricted, by laws which establish policies, procedures, or rules 
in personnel matters.
Particularly, I want to emphasize my conviction that militant 
tactics have no place in the functions of any organization of 
Government employees. Upon employees in the Federal service rests 
the obligation to serve the whole people, whose interests and welfare 
require orderliness and continuity in the conduct of Government 
activities. This obligation is paramount. Since their own services 
have to do with the functioning of the Government, a strike of 
public employees manifests nothing less than an intent on their part 
to prevent or obstruct the operations of Government until their 
demands are satisfied. Such action, looking toward the paralysis of 
Government by those who have sworn to support it, is unthinkable 
and intolerable. It is, therefore, with a feeling of gratification that I 
have noted in the constitution of the National Federation of Federal 
Employees the provision that “under no circumstances shall this 
Federation engage in or support strikes against the United States 
Government.”
I congratulate the National Federation of Federal Employees the
twentieth anniversary of its founding and trust that the convention 
will, in every way, be successful.
Very sincerely yours, [signature omitted in original]109
As I read the letter, Roosevelt is indeed quite clear about his opposition 
to strikes by public employees, but his position on collective bargaining 
seems to me to be more nuanced than the sound-bite version suggests. In 
the passages I have italicized, the President expresses support in principle 
for government consultation on a wide variety of matters—he specifically 
mentions wages, hours, working conditions, advancement, and grievances—
with an organization representing its employees. And his point about the 
differences between the public and private setting, I take it, is not that 
collective bargaining and contractual commitments on such topics should 
be prohibited in the former but rather—turning now to the second italicized 
passage—that the authority of “administrative officials” to make such 
commitments was bounded by law, evincing a concern that the officials 
109. Id. (emphasis added).
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involved in “personnel management” are not acting of their own accord but 
answer instead (as the saying goes) to a higher authority. Thus, he 
contends, their authority is “governed and guided, and in many instances 
restricted, by laws which establish policies, procedures, or rules in personnel 
matters.”
But he has chosen his words carefully here—he knows how to say 
“unthinkable and intolerable” but instead he says “governed,” “guided,”
and “restricted,” even circumscribing the last with an adverbial phrase (“in 
many instances”), which suggests that “restriction” is not the rule but the 
exception. The punchline is that invoking President Roosevelt as an 
implacable opponent of public-sector bargaining on the basis of the letter in 
question is not an entirely convincing enterprise. It is also somewhat 
difficult to square with the legislation he had signed just a few years earlier 
creating the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), which authorized a fairly 
robust form of collective bargaining for federal employees.110
Two final thoughts. First, in point of fact, it would not trouble me to 
learn that a President who supported collective bargaining rights for 
private-sector workers had a different view when it came to the public 
sector. A few years back, I witnessed first-hand what happens when a 
charismatic University President—who had previously served with 
distinction as the Secretary of Health and Human Services under a 
Democratic President—faced the prospect of a union organizing campaign 
among janitors and landscapers who worked for poverty-level wages and 
enjoyed nothing in the way of either health or human services from the 
university and its labor contractor, and it wasn’t pretty.111 It therefore 
would not surprise me to learn that a liberal icon who voiced strong support 
for the rights of workers generally had a rather different view of such rights 
when they were exercised closer to home. Like the University President, 
President Roosevelt was after all an employer. And in my own experience 
there is no leader more dreadful to work for than one who is dazzled by the 
righteousness of his or her mission, whatever its political skew. Indeed, the 
notion that public administration is filled to the brim with do-gooder 
liberals who don’t have the heart to stand up to their workers is surely wide 
of the mark; the workers who toil in their service may be the ones who need 
a union and a strong say in their work lives the most.
110. For an excellent account of the role of collective bargaining at the TVA, see SLATER, 
supra note 8, at 83, 221 n.57.
111. See Richard Michael Fischl, The Other Side of the Picket Line: Contract, Democracy, and 
Power in a Law School Classroom, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 517 (2007) 
(describing and criticizing the University President’s tenacious but ultimately 
unsuccessful efforts to thwart the organizing campaign).
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The second and final point comes full circle to my basic argument—
what’s at stake in Wisconsin is workplace democracy. There is a counter-
argument, of course, that public-sector bargaining is anti-democratic, that 
it grants governing power to an institution that is neither elected by nor 
answerable to the sovereign citizens. That’s certainly one way to read 
President Roosevelt’s cautions, and it is a school of thought that has 
enjoyed acceptance over the years in some formidable scholarly and 
intellectual circles.112
But I confess that I’ve always had a difficult time understanding that 
point, since public officials bargain with unelected institutions all the 
time—defense contractors, office supply companies, landlords, and the host 
of other firms that provide goods or services to the government. Why is it 
problematic to bargain with workers but not with firms? If the vice is 
thought to lie in the fact that it’s collective bargaining, then we would do 
well to recall the central lesson in Justice Holmes’s brilliant dissent in 
Vegelahn v. Guntner113: capital is collective too.
A related and more familiar argument is that unionized public-sector
workers get “two bites at the apple”—i.e., the deployment of union power 
in the selection of the very officials with whom their unions will bargain. To 
be sure, there is once again a parallel to other government contractors, and 
so long as we live in a world in which corporate contributors enjoy a 
considerable capacity to shape the scope and direction of our politics, it 
seems to me that the countervailing voice provided by public and private-
sector unions on behalf of working people is a necessary and undeniable 
good. Indeed, the employees whose union rights are under attack in 
Wisconsin—in particular, the women providing home health care and 
family child care who have lost their bargaining rights altogether; the 
teachers in the elementary and secondary schools whose rights to bargain 
over pay, health care, and pension benefits have been greatly curtailed; and 
the workers without high school degrees who have gained the most 
materially from collective bargaining—are, by any fair measure, greatly 
under-represented groups in American politics. The notion that the 
amplified voice that union representation has afforded them undermines 
democracy—meaning the democracy we actually have rather than the New 
England town meeting we might imagine—strikes me as singularly 
unpersuasive.
112. See Malin, supra note 8, at 1370-74 (collecting a variety of authorities for this 
argument).
113. 44 N.E. 1077, 1080 (Mass. 1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Moreover, it seems to me that the arguments against public-sector
bargaining ultimately rest on a cramped view of proper governance—of 
commands issuing from the sovereign—rather than a dialogic one far more 
compatible with the complexity of the administrative state and democracy 
on the ground. Indeed, it sounds a lot like running a government as if it 
were a business. But in the American workplace, the notion of governance 
as commands issuing from the sovereign is the problem; democracy is the 
solution.
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